Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United States, Canada and
Australia
13 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law (forthcoming 2006)
Caroline Forell ∗
Clayton R. Hess Professor of Law

The laws that are going to be amended in this area will one day, in the
not-too-distant future, be spoken about by me and other people to the
amazement of our daughters and their friends. They will be amazed
that these laws ever existed. I will talk about the fact that a law
existed that provided . . . a partial excuse, for killing a domestic
partner . . . based on the notion that it was understandable that the
accused lost control and became so violent as to kill their partner
because their relationship was under threat.1
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Introduction
Men who commit domestic homicide by killing intimate or former intimate partners often
do so out of jealousy, possessiveness and rage—in the heat of passion.2 Women who commit
domestic homicide often kill out of fear and despair—they kill their batterers.3 Both men and
women frequently assert the partial defense of provocation for this ultimate act of domestic
violence.4 If provocation is found, it reduces murder to manslaughter, which usually results in a
substantially shorter prison sentence.5 Two gender equality issues are presented by this reality,
both relating to domestic violence. First, why should jealous killers be allowed to argue
provocation when their victims did nothing legally wrong? Second, why are most battered
women who kill their batterers not fully excused based on self-defense? If substantive gender
equality were considered adequately, killings out of jealousy and rage would result in murder
convictions,6 while most killings out of fear and despair would result in acquittals.7

2

See Jenny Morgan, Critique and Comment, Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No
Tales, Tales Are Told About Them, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 237, 256 (1997) (citing NEW SOUTH
WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 31, PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY & INFANTICIDE 3.98 (1993) [hereinafter NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM
COMM’N]).
3
See id. at 256-57.
4
The other situation where provocation is frequently asserted is homicide as a result of a fight
between men. See, e.g., NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.8.
5
See CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE
WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 173-74 (New York Univ. Press 2000).
6
See id. at 178; see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE FINAL
REPORT xv (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N], http://www.lawreform.
vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide_Final_Report/$file/FinalReport.pdf.
7
See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 214.
2

Two visions of gender equality, formal and substantive,8 can be used to analyze the
criminal defense of provocation as applied in domestic homicide cases. Formal equality means
equality of treatment so that like cases are treated alike. Under formal gender equality, the same
legal rule applies to men and women when both sexes engage in similar conduct or are similarly
situated.9 This is often effective in breaking down gender stereotypes, for example, by allowing
women to be executors of estates10 or attend state military academies.11 However, formal
equality is problematic when used to justify retaining certain male-biased defenses, and
expanding their application to women rather than abolishing them. Provocation, when applied in
domestic homicide cases, is such a defense.
Unlike formal equality, substantive equality seeks to accommodate the varied needs and
experiences of subordinated groups.12 Substantive gender equality insists that the law take into
account and respond to the actual effect of a rule on both men and women, thereby better

8

See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
265 (3d ed. 2002) (distinguishing between the two visions of equality described by one group of
commentators as follows: “[w]hile formal sex equality judges the form of a rule, requiring that it
treat women and men on the same terms without special barriers or favors on account of their
sex, substantive equality looks to a rule’s results or effects.”).
9
See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that although the same laws are
applied to men and women under formal gender equality, the laws may punish women for not
being men in areas “where consensus and commonality between men and woman simply do not
exist”).
10
See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (applying heightened scrutiny for the first time
to gender discrimination where a statute gave mandatory preference to fathers over mothers as
administrators of deceased child's estate). The Court held that dissimilar treatment for men and
women who are similarly situated violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
11
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557-58 (1996) (applying heightened scrutiny
to Virginia Military Institute’s sex-based admissions policy and holding that denying women
admittance because of their gender violates the Equal Protection Clause).
12
See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, A Conversation About Equality, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 65,
69 (2000) (remarking that: “equality isn’t just about being treated the same, and it isn’t a
mathematical equation waiting to be solved. Rather, it is about equal human dignity, and full
membership in society.”).
3

assuring that justice for all is achieved.13 It requires more than just making the provocation
defense available to both men and women who kill out of jealousy and rage, or out of fear and
despair. Instead, applying substantive equality would mean that killing in a heat of passion out
of sexual possessiveness would no longer be an acceptable basis for a claim of provocation
because everyone has a right to sexual and physical autonomy. Applying substantive equality
would also mean that killing one’s batterer out of fear would often be a basis for self-defense
because everyone has a right to defend him or herself from physical harm.
With these desired substantive gender equality outcomes in mind, this article examines
and compares the law of provocation as it applies to domestic homicide in United States, Canada
and the Australia.14 Every state, province and territory, with the exceptions of the Australian
states of Tasmania and Victoria, retains some form of the provocation defense or, in some
American states, the Model Penal Code’s even more pro-defendant extreme emotional
disturbance defense.15 This article examines why substantive equality, prevalent under Canadian
constitutional law,16 has not resulted in more woman-friendly provocation rules in Canada and
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See id. (noting that an examination of substantive rights violations must consider the treatment
of the different groups within the context of society, as differential treatment in some instances
may lead to substantive equality, while similar treatment in other cases may lead to substantive
inequality).
14
Provocation is an area where the constitutional doctrine of equal protection has played little or
no part in the development of the law. Therefore, this article examines whether the statutes and
case law in these areas are gender-biased and how much formal or substantive gender equality
exists.
15
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2004). The Code prescribes that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when . . . (b) a homicide which
would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be.
Id.
16
See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
4

why Australia is the leader in incorporating substantive equality into its provocation doctrine.
I. Provocation Overview
The origins of the provocation defense are deeply gendered; it was created for and has
always been used far more often by men than women. Well before any of the three countries
achieved independence from England, the provocation defense began as a common law doctrine
about men defending their honor.17 Until the nineteenth century, provocation rules explicitly
treated men and women differently. In the domestic homicide context, the defense was limited
to men and was only available when husbands killed after finding their wives in the act of
adultery.18 Over time, the defense of provocation came to excuse “heat of passion” rather than
honor.19 The defense has further evolved so that today any form of perceived infidelity or

17

See Bernard J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a
Defence to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 312-13 (1963) (noting that killing
during “embroilments to settle so-called ‘breaches of honour’” was excusable during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England because of the absence of malice and the
existence of provocation serious enough to deprive one of their self-control).
18
See R. v. Mawgridge, (1707) 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1114-15 (K.B. U.K.) (including provocation
in the adultery context for the first time). Lord Holt CJ defined the categories of conduct for
which provocation was available to include “when a man is taken in adultery . . . with another
man’s wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare
manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property.”
Id. at 1115; Ian Leader-Elliot, Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation, in
SEXING THE SUBJECT OF LAW 149, 153 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens eds., LBC
Information Services 1997) (suggesting that originally provocation based on witnessing adultery
was only available to the husband for killing his sexual rival not his wife). Leader-Elliot refers
to two English cases, R. v. Pearson, (1835) 168 Eng. Rep. 1133 (U.K.) and R. v. Kelly, (1848)
175 Eng. Rep. 342 (Monmouth Assizes U.K.), where the law allowed provocation for killing the
unfaithful wife. Id. at 157; see also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 19
(New York Univ. Press 2003) (describing other bases for provocation that do not involve
domestic homicide such as aggravated assault or battery, mutual combat, commission of a
serious crime against a close relative of the defendant and illegal arrest). Today, provocation is
often argued in the context of mutual combat situations such as bar brawls. In these contexts,
both the parties are usually male.
19
Many provocation statutes expressly include the phrase “heat of passion.” See, e.g., Criminal
Code, 1913, § 281 (W. Austl.) (stating that “[w]hen a person who unlawfully kills another . . .
does the act which causes death in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, and before
5

attempt to leave an intimate relationship may suffice to support a “heat of passion” claim.20
Thus, the provocation defense has continued to be specially designed for men.
Despite the intent of the provocation defense to provide a concession to a human frailty
that is more typically male, today the rare woman who kills out of rage and jealousy,
theoretically, can also use the defense.21 Therefore, even though the vast majority of people who
kill their partners or former partners out of rage, jealousy or hurt pride are men, provocation law
now provides a version of formal equality.22 However, equality considerations under the
provocation doctrine have not been limited solely to allowing women to assert the same heat of
passion rationale as men. Substantive equality has played an important role in the recent
development of provocation doctrine. In all three countries, the provocation defense can now be
asserted when a person kills in an emotional state other than rage and jealousy, most notably
fear, which is much more likely to be an emotion on which a battered woman would base her

there is time for his passion to cool, he is guilty of manslaughter only.”) (emphasis added);
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 232 (1974) (determining that “[c]ulpable homicide
that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who committed it
did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.”) (emphasis added); see also
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (1980) (asserting that “[i]n a prosecution [for murder], it is a
defense that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, before there had been a reasonable
opportunity for the passion to cool, when the heat of passion resulted from a serious provocation
by the intended victim.”) (emphasis added).
20
See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1355-56 (1997).
21
See LEE, supra note 18, at 26; see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 256 (noting that the author
“found no reported Australian cases where women were provoked into killing men who left them
or who ‘confessed adultery.’”). I say “theoretically” because there is evidence that juries are less
sympathetic to women than to men who kill intimates out of rage and jealousy. LEE, supra note
18, at 52. It was not until 1946 that England acknowledged that a woman who killed her
husband when he was engaged in adultery could use the provocation defense. See Holmes v.
Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 588, 592 (U.K.).
22
See Victoria Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the Idea of
the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 365 (2004). See generally FORELL &
MATTHEWS, supra note 5.
6

claim.23 Expanding provocation’s rationales to mitigate the punishment of these women, rather
than exonerating them through self-defense, amounts to only partial progress towards full
substantive equality.24 However, progress it is.
Another area where substantive equality may have influenced the provocation doctrine is
the relaxation or elimination of the traditional requirements that there was no time to cool off
between the provocation and the killing,25 and that there was some particular triggering
incident.26 These changes, which have been recognized in some American and many Australian
jurisdictions,27 sometimes work in favor of battered women who kill—for example, in cases
where a battered woman kills her batterer while he is asleep.28 However, because these changes
are not limited to situations where a battered woman kills out of fear, they also benefit people
who kill out of jealousy. One of the most notorious and oft-discussed provocation cases is
People v. Berry.29 In Berry, expanding the cooling off period under the traditional provocation

23

See, e.g., Van Den Hoek v. The Queen (1986) 161 C.L.R. 158, ¶ 17 (Austl.) (Mason, J.). See
generally Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597
(2004) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (New York Univ. Press 2003)).
24
See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
25
See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the requirement that there be no time to cool off is
part of the modern test for provocation except under the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional
disturbance test).
26
See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2)(b) (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (stating that the provoking conduct
can have “occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous
time.”).
27
See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 23(2) (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.);
see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 24, 52.
28
See, e.g., R. v. Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A. Crim. R. 1 (Austl.) (finding that cumulative acts
of domestic violence could cause sufficient loss of control that a woman could be acting in selfdefense when she kills her sleeping husband); see also State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 174
(Wis. 1983) (holding that a long history of abuse, and provocation on day of the shooting, was
sufficient to raise a jury question as to heat of passion despite the fact the victim was asleep
when his wife shot him).
29
556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). Some of the recent California cases that discuss Berry involve heat
of passion killings where the jury was instructed on provocation, yet found that the evidence
7

test benefited a man who killed his wife in the heat of passion.30 In another case involving male
rage and jealousy, Parker v. R.,31 the Privy Council reversed the majority decision of the
Australian High Court, agreeing with the dissenting judges that provocation’s “no time to cool
off” requirement be relaxed.32 Thus, these changes are not particularly good examples of
substantive equality.
II. The Provocation Divide
Today, both men and women can base their provocation claim on either jealous rage or
fear. However, the gendered reality is that the bases for asserting the provocation defense in
domestic homicide cases are sex-segregated. Men almost exclusively use heat of passion based
on jealousy while women almost exclusively use fear. For different reasons, both male-gendered
heat of passion and female-gendered fear are likely to continue to be allowed as justifications for
a provocation defense in the United States, Canada and most Australian jurisdictions.
In all three countries, approximately three-quarters of the perpetrators of domestic
homicide are male.33 Many of these men have previously committed violence against their

supported a murder verdict. This bolsters the argument I make later in the article, see infra notes
89-102 and accompanying text, that even though juries are being given provocation instructions,
they are finding that heat of passion is not a valid basis for finding provocation. See, e.g., People
v. Williams, No. A094710, 2003 WL 21246611 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. May 30, 2003);
People v. Pemberton, Nos. C036700, C037010, 2002 WL 436959 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002).
30
See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the cooling off period in Berry was so elastic as to
allow a husband to claim heat of passion two weeks after learning of his wife’s infidelity); see
also Rebecca Bradfield, Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian
Perspective on the Jealous Husband and the Battered Wife, 19 U. TAS. L. REV. 5, 13 (2000).
Under the more modern and pro-defendant Model Penal Code the cooling off period requirement
has been completely eliminated. See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that had Berry arisen in a
Model Penal Code state, no cooling off period would have been required).
31
See (1964) A.C. 1369, rev’g (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610 (Austl.).
32
See Parker (1964) A.C. at 1369.
33
See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME
DATA BRIEF, NCJ 197838, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003) [hereinafter CRIME
DATE BRIEF], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
8

female victims.34 Nevertheless, they are frequently permitted to use the provocation defense
even when the female victims’ “provoking” conduct was a lawful exercise of sexual or personal
autonomy, such as sexual intercourse with another or leaving the relationship.35 Most
jurisdictions continue to provide this broadened version of the traditional provocation defense as
a “concession to human frailty.”36 As this article will show, the harshness of lengthy mandatory
minimum sentences for murder is likely the decisive reason why this trend has continued
unabated in Canada and the United States, but not in some Australian jurisdictions where such
determinate sentencing has been abolished.
Women commit domestic homicide much less frequently than do men.37 When they do
kill, they usually kill their batterers out of fear and despair. In all three countries, battered
women who kill routinely rely on provocation or some other basis for reducing murder to
manslaughter38 because their often more appropriate claims of self-defense, that would result in

2005); see also ANDRÉE CÔTÉ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN AND THE LAW, STOP EXCUSING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1.2 (2000), available at http://www.nawl.ca/provocation.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2005); Morgan, supra note 2, at 239. Men most frequently commit homicides
of both sexes, while the vast majority of homicide victims are male. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 388-89 (Aspen Publishers 2000) (1986); JENNY
MOUZOS, 2003-2004 NAT’L HOMICIDE MONITORING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT, HOMICIDE IN
AUSTRALIA 11, 17 (2004).
34
See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (noting that one third of women killed by their spouses
in Ontario had previously reported domestic violence to the police, and that if unreported cases
were included, a large majority of cases of spousal homicide would be preceded by male
violence).
35
See Nourse, supra note 20, at 1407-08.
36
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23 (citing R. v. Kirkham, (1837) 173 Eng.
Rep. 422, 424 (U.K.)); see also Parker (1963) 111 C.L.R. at 652 (quoting East’s Pleas of the
Crown (1803) vol. 1, 238) (stating to have received “such a provocation as the law presumes
might in human frailty heat the blood to a proportionable degree of resentment, and keep it
boiling to the moment of the fact.”).
37
See CRIME DATA BRIEF, supra note 33.
38
For example, in Australia, battered women who kill may also argue lack of intent to kill,
diminished responsibility and excessive self-defense. See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N,
supra note 6, at 97-98; FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 164; Rebecca Bradfield, The
9

acquittal, fail.39 Thus, provocation is usually viewed as a backup defense for battered women.
Battered women’s self-defense claims too frequently fail because, like provocation, selfdefense was designed with men’s conduct in mind. Self-defense is based on a “male code of
combat.”40 Thus, when a battered woman uses a gun or knife to kill her unarmed batterer, or
kills him when he is asleep or otherwise unaware of her attack, a judge may decline to give a
self-defense jury instruction because the defendant’s conduct fails to fit the requirements of the
jurisdiction’s self-defense rule. Similarly, if a judge gives a self-defense instruction to a jury, the
jury may find that the defendant’s conduct does not meet the requirements of the rule. Even if a
battered woman’s conduct does fit within the jurisdiction’s self-defense rule, a jury may decide
that her deadly response was not justified under current social norms.41 As one commentator
notes:
The continued association of self-defence with a . . . confrontation will continue
to make it difficult for jurors to identify actions taken in self-protection as ‘selfdefence’ outside this context. This may particularly disadvantage those
responding to an ongoing threat of harm, rather than a single attack or threat of
violence, and those who kill in non-confrontational circumstances.
. . .[In the context of family violence] where a person’s actions have been carried
out in fear for their lives and under a belief there is no alternative, self-defence
should not be excluded simply because he or she killed in non-confrontational
circumstances or in response to an ongoing threat of violence, rather than an
immediate attack.42
Treatment of Women Who Kill Their Male Partners Within the Australian Criminal Justice
System 104-08 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Tasmania) (on file with the
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
39
See R. v. M., [1998] D.L.R. (4th) 513 (Can.) (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring); ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 118-20 (Yale Univ. Press 2000).
40
See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 201; see also REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY
MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 438-40 (2d ed., The Federation Press 2002).
41
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 83; see also FORELL & MATTHEWS,
supra note 5, at 216-17.
42
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 68; see FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note
5, at 201-02; see also Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 375-76 (Austl.) (footnotes omitted)
(expressing concerns among both laypeople and those that are legally trained that too liberal a
10

Rebecca Bradfield’s study of sixty-five Australian Supreme Court cases43 where battered
women killed their husbands over the period between 1980 and 2000 illustrates the difficulties in
obtaining a self-defense verdict. Of the twenty-one cases where battered women raised selfdefense, only nine were acquitted, while eleven were convicted of manslaughter and one of
murder.44 Obviously, a successful provocation claim, while perhaps not providing a battered
woman with complete justice, will often provide a fairer result than a finding of murder.
Bradfield’s study further demonstrates the importance of provocation to battered women.
In all twenty-two cases where a battered woman claimed provocation at trial, she was
successful.45 The provocation defense, therefore, provided battered women an important fallback
option. This was not true for men who claimed provocation.46 Men received a manslaughter
verdict in only eight out of fifteen cases where provocation based on jealous rage was argued at
trial.47

self-defense rule would allow battered women to engage in violent self-help). Justice Kirby of
the Australian High Court held:
No civilised society removes its protection to human life simply because of the
existence of a history of long-term physical or psychological abuse. If it were so,
it would expose to unsanctioned homicide a large number of persons who, in the
nature of things, would not be able to give their version of the facts. The law
expects a greater measure of self-control in unwanted situations where human life
is at stake. It reserves cases of provocation and self-defence to truly exceptional
circumstances. Whilst these circumstances may be affected by contemporary
conditions and attitudes, there is no legal carte blanche, including for people in
abusive relationships, to engage in premeditated homicide. Nor in my view
should there be.
Id. at 375.
43
Supreme Courts are the highest state appellate courts in Australia. See
http://www.nla.gov.au/oz/law.html.
44
See id.
45
See id. at 144-45. Bradfield also notes that in sixty-five out of seventy-six cases where a
woman killed her husband or ex-husband, there was a history of physical violence. Id. at 22.
46
See id. at 145.
47
See id.; see also Elizabeth Sheehy, Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 39
11

Although imperfect, the provocation defense makes manslaughter, which carries a
substantially shorter sentence than murder, a viable outcome for battered women. This presents
a dilemma for those who seek to reform criminal law to ensure that battered women who kill are
treated justly, while at the same time eliminating the jealous heat of passion basis for a
manslaughter verdict. What happens to battered women if provocation is abolished and therefore
no longer available to them? One possibility is that acquittal based on a successful self-defense
claim will replace it as the most common outcome. Another possibility is that other defenses
such as diminished capacity will take up the slack for provocation. However, another possibility
is the substantial increase in murder convictions.
Men’s heat of passion and women’s fear are both likely to continue to be allowed as
bases for provocation in most jurisdictions because lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for
murder are deemed too harsh. These mandatory sentences, along with the frequent failure of
self-defense claims when battered women kill out of fear, make a manslaughter option
necessary.48 However, permitting both heat of passion and fear as bases for a provocation
defense may be less problematic than it first appears. There is intriguing evidence that even in
Canada and the United States, where the goal of substantive gender equality has had little effect
on the law of provocation, the feminist critiques of the past thirty years have combined with
changing social values to influence the application of the provocation defense by prosecutors,
judges, and juries. As this article will show, evolving community assessments of violence
arising out of possessiveness and violence resulting from fear may frequently be resulting in

OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529, 531 (2001) (noting that “none [of the many strategies to reform self
defense] can be credited with achieving any marked increase in acquittals for battered women on
trial.”).
48
See Bradfield, supra note 38, at 108-28 (contending that lack of intent is the most frequent
basis for domestic homicide manslaughter conviction for women).
12

substantive gender equality under provocation and other criminal law rules that were created
with men in mind.
III.

Differences and Similarities among the Three Countries
Certain commonalities exist that may be relevant to how provocation claims are treated.

All three nations have their legal roots in English common law and have constitutions creating
federal systems that divide government between the centralized national government and states
or provinces. As a result, a variety of different jurisdictions within each country make and apply
criminal law, including the provocation defense. In all three countries, feminist legal scholars,
lawyers and jurists have vigorously critiqued the traditional provocation doctrine,49 and thus,
helped shape both current provocation law and social norms concerning violence based on
jealousy and violence based on fear.
Differences among the three legal systems may affect their provocation rules. While
Canada has one federal provocation statute for the entire nation, separate provocation rules exist
in each of the fifty American states and eight Australian states and territories. As a result, in the
United States and Canada there is an opportunity for concurrently developing different legal

49

See, e.g., CÔTÉ ET AL, supra note 33 (writing in the United States); FORELL & MATTHEWS,
supra note 5, at 196; Adrian Howe, Provoking Comment: The Question of Gender Bias in the
Provocation Defence—A Victorian Case Study, in AUSTRALIAN WOMEN: CONTEMPORARY
FEMINIST THOUGHT 230-31 (Norma Grieve and Ailsa Burns eds., 1994) (writing in Australia);
LEE, supra note 18, at 276-78; STANLEY M.H. YEO, UNRESTRAINED KILLINGS AND THE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF PROVOCATION AND EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN
INDIA, ENGLAND, AND AUSTRALIA 182-83 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998);
Bradfield, supra, note 30, at 5; Wayne Gorman, Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence, 42
CRIM. L. Q. 478, 499-500 (1999) (writing in Canada); Edward M. Hyland, R. v. Thibert: Are
There Any Ordinary People Left, 28 OTTAWA L. REV. 145, 168-69 (1997); Morgan, supra note 2;
Nourse, supra note 20, at 1339-42; Gary T. Trotter, Anger, Provocation, and the Intent for
Murder, 47 MCGILL L.J. 669, 688 (2002).
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rules concerning domestic homicide.50 Furthermore, as courts of final review of state criminal
cases, Australia’s and Canada’s highest federal courts have decided a number of provocation
cases, providing guidance on the issue at a national level. In contrast, the United States Supreme
Court lacks jurisdiction to review homicide cases concerning provocation because provocation
typically does not involve a constitutional or federal issue.51 Because criminal law is an area
traditionally reserved to the states, in the United States there is little judicial guidance concerning
provocation doctrine from federal courts.
A potentially important difference when it comes to gender and equality analysis is the
gender make-up of the judiciary, especially the highest appellate court.52 Even when, as in the
United States, the highest federal court does not review provocation cases, the Court’s views on
gender equality influence other legal decision-makers. The women who have been on the bench
have often been staunch proponents of gender equality and, therefore, their presence may make a
difference in how equality analysis applies to gender discrimination and evolves over time.53

50

In the United States, there are two sets of “heat of passion” rules: traditional provocation rules
and the Model Penal Code’s Extreme Emotional Disturbance provision. See infra Part IV. In
Australia there are at least four different ways that states deal with provocation. See infra Part
VI.
51
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (noting the power of Supreme Court and other federal courts to
adjudicate constitutional and federal claims; claims between states; claims between a state and
citizens of another state; claims between citizens of different states; and claims between a state
or its citizens and foreign governments or their citizens). But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975) (holding that due process mandates that the prosecution bear the burden of proving
the absence of provocation).
52
See generally Fred O. Smith, Note, Gendered Justice: Do Male and Female Judges Rule
Differently on Questions of Gay Rights?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 2087, 2090-97 (2005).
53
Female Justices have played major roles in cases that favor women’s rights. See, e.g., Jackson
v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1509-10 (2005) (upholding a suit for retaliation
under Title IX, where Justice Ginsburg joined Justice O’Connor’s five to four opinion allowing
a male coach to sue after he was allegedly fired for complaining about sex discrimination against
his public high school female basketball team); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557
(1996) (shifting the line between intermediate scrutiny for gender and strict scrutiny for race in
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion requiring an all-male state military school to admit women);
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The gender make-up of the highest courts in Australia, Canada and the United States is
quite different. While the Australian High Court has previously included one female member,54
currently there are none.55 At present, the United States Supreme Court includes only one
female member, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She is one of America’s leading proponents of
feminist formal equality that focuses on eliminating gender stereotypes.56
The membership of the Canadian Supreme Court differs significantly from the Australian
High Court and the United States Supreme Court. Currently it has four female members,
including the Chief Justice.57 Furthermore, up until Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé’s retirement
in 2002, she was a highly influential judicial proponent of substantive equality.58 The difference
in representation of women on each nation’s highest court is consistent with the differences in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 25 (1993) (exemplifying Justice O’Connor and
Justice Ginsburg’s commitment in advancing women’s interests in the area of sexual
harassment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (showing Justice
O’Connor’s influence in preserving the right to abortion by upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)); see also Diana Majury, The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation
and Celebration, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 312-13 (2002) (recounting female judges making
a difference in Canadian equality analysis). See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female
Judges Do Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114
YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (finding that female judges mattered to outcomes in Title VII sexual
harassment and sex discrimination cases).
54
Justice Mary Gaudron was the only female justice sitting on the Australian High Court. See
generally Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316 (Austl.) (Gaudron, J.) (expounding on provocation
and battered women).
55
See Rachel Davis & George Williams, A Century of Appointments but Only One Woman, 28
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 54, 54 (2003) (noting that since Justice Mary Gaudron’s retirement in 2003,
no other women have joined the court).
56
See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 829-31 (1990);
see also Kathryn A. Lee, Note, Intermediate Review “With Teeth” in Gender Discrimination
Cases: The New Standard in United States v. Virginia, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 221,
225, n.35 (1997). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman appointed to the United States
Supreme Court, submitted her resignation in 2005 and was replaced by Justice Samuel Alito in
February 2006.
57
The nine current Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court include the following female
justices: Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, Justice Marie Deschamps, Justice Rosalie Abella and
Justice Louise Charron.
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overall representation of women as senior judges in the three countries. In 2003, only 14.6% of
the Australian senior judiciary was female59 while women represented 24% of the U.S. federal
judiciary in 200560 and 26% of the Canadian appellate bench in 1999.61
The three countries also differ on how constitutional law treats gender equality.
Although the different impact that the provocation defense has on women and men is not likely
to be considered a constitutional equality issue,62 it is useful to consider the amount of protection
the federal constitutions provide for women because this may influence how gender equality is
viewed in non-constitutional law areas such as the provocation defense. Neither the United
States nor Australian Constitutions expressly provide for equality of the sexes. However, even
though it includes no reference to sex equality, the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause63 has been interpreted to require close scrutiny of cases in which the
government discriminates based on gender.64 Under the U.S. Constitution, gender equality is
formal.65 Thus, only when men and women are not viewed as similarly situated is sex
discrimination permissible.66 Unlike either the United States or Canada, Australia’s Constitution

58

See Majury, supra note 53, at 311.
See Davis & Williams, supra note 55, at 56.
60
See FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., WOMEN STILL UNDERREPRESENTED ON THE FEDERAL BENCH,
July 5, 2005, http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/printnews.asp?id=9138 (citing the New
York Times).
61
See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Outsiders on the Bench: The Continuing Struggle for Equality,
16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 16-17 (2001).
62
See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (indicating that at least one set of Canadian feminist
commentators, on behalf of Canada’s National Association of Women and the Law, has
proposed that the provocation defense, as it now exists in Canada, violates the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms sex equality provision).
63
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
64
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
65
See, e.g., KATHERINE BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 117-18 (3d. Ed. 2002).
66
See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974). On at least one occasion, Congress has
59
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has neither an equal protection clause nor any other provision that has been used to address
gender inequality. As a result, Australia has neither formal nor substantive constitutional gender
equality jurisprudence.67
Canada, under its 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, treats gender equality quite
differently from Australia and the United States.68 The Charter explicitly provides for sex
equality free from government discrimination.69 This has been interpreted to mean substantive
equality70 based on equal human dignity and full membership in society.71 Retired Supreme
Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé describes Canada’s equality provision “as combining the
stepped in to provide substantive equality concerning pregnancy when the Supreme Court had
insisted on formal equality. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(k) (current through P.L. 109-65 (excluding P.L. 109-59) approved Sept. 20, 2005)
(legislation pending) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s holding in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under
Title VII); see also Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981)
(allowing for gender distinctions in a statutory rape statute because women and men bear
different burdens in sexual intercourse and pregnancy).
67
See SURI RATNAPALA, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND THEORY 274
(Trischa Baker ed., 2002); see also GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 40, at 211 (concluding that
lack of any federal constitutional gender equality doctrine and stating that “[i]n Australia,
because of the absence of a constitutional right to ‘equality’, it is not easy and probably not even
possible to present an equality argument to a court in the context of, say, a criminal prosecution
of a doctor for performing an abortion.”). The federal Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 provides
the primary protection against discrimination on the basis of sex. This Act has been described as
taking “a formal equality approach.” See GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 40, at 28-29
(quoting the examination of deficiencies in formal equality or gender neutral treatment from
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 69, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: WOMEN’S
EQUALITY, Part II 3.9 (1994).
68
See Constitution Act, 1982, 79 enacted as Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(1)
(U.K.).
69
See id.
70
See Majury, supra note 53, at 305 (stating that: “equality writing accepts that substantive
equality is the operative model in Canadian law.”).
71
See Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(1) (declaring that “[e]very individual is equal before and
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 28
(stating, “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are
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[United States Constitution’s] Equal Protection Clause . . . and an equal rights amendment.”72
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, who helped shape Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence from a
substantive equality perspective, emphasizes how different Canada’s provision demanding
“equality without discrimination” is from the same-as-men formulation that is the prevailing
equality analysis in Australia and the United States.73
Canada’s embrace of substantive equality and its high percentage of female appellate
judges led me originally to predict that Canada would treat any issue where the victims are
overwhelmingly female and the perpetrators overwhelmingly male as meriting a substantive
equality analysis. If not, I at least expected that Canada’s law would be more feminist and
protective of women’s rights and interests than Australia or the United States. Therefore, I
expected that traditional provocation doctrine, which so clearly favors male rage and jealousy
over other emotions, would have been found to be a form of gender discrimination that needed to
be either substantially revised or abolished, especially since Canadian courts have held that the
values set out in the Charter should influence how statutes and the common law are interpreted.74
However, this has not been the Canadian experience with provocation law even though Charterbased substantive equality arguments have been made.75 Instead, Canada, much of Australia and

guaranteed equally to male and female persons.”).
72
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 61, at 20.
73
See id.
74
See Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 at 184. The Canadian Supreme Court stated:
Though the parties have not relied on the Charter, and have simply referred to the
common law sources in examining the scope of the power to search, I feel that the
courts should “apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner
consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution.”
Id. (quoting Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd., [1986]
2 S.C.R. at 603); see also Dir. of Family and Children’s Servs. v. E.I., [2005] YKSC 4, ¶ 47
(explaining that “statutory interpretation can and should be done in a manner consistent with the
fundamental values enshrined in the Charter.”).
75
See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (noting that the primary beneficiaries of the expanded
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the slim majority of American states that do not apply the Model Penal Code’s extreme
emotional disturbance test that is even more solicitous of male rage and jealousy,76 have similar
traditional provocation rules.77
Notably, however, two Australian states have completely rejected this traditional
approach: Tasmania, where the provocation defense was abolished in 2003,78 and Victoria,
where the provocation defense was abolished in November 2005.79 Both jurisdictions’
explanations for abolition highlight the decisive impact that elimination of statutorily imposed
limits on judges’ sentencing discretion can have on the retention of a provocation rule.
In the next three sections, I examine in detail how provocation is treated in the United
States, Canada and Australia. I conclude that the preference for formal or substantive equality in
a jurisdiction’s constitutional jurisprudence seems to have no influence on its provocation rules.
Instead, the differing amounts of judicial sentencing discretion in each jurisdiction provide the
greatest influence on how fully substantive equality is incorporated into a jurisdiction’s handling
of the provocation defense. In particular, I demonstrate that presence or absence of mandatory
minimum sentencing, especially regarding murder, has been highly influential in shaping each
country’s provocation rules.
IV.

United States Provocation Law
Because of the severe limitations on judicial discretion concerning sentencing, the United

provocation defense in Canada have been men, sometimes allowing them to “get away with
murder.”).
76
See LEE, supra note 18, at 34-39 (describing this male-biased code as allowing mitigation
whenever a defendant can show he is suffering from extreme emotional distress at the time of the
homicide). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2004).
77
See Forell, supra note 23, at 608-09.
78
See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (Tas.) amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition
of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.) (removing §160, which contained the defense of
provocation, from the Criminal Code).

19

States presents a bleak picture regarding incorporating substantive equality into its provocation
doctrine.80 Currently, for violent crimes such as manslaughter and murder, all fifty American
states have some form of determinate sentencing, most frequently mandatory minimum
sentences and sentencing guidelines.81 This often gives American trial judges substantially less
room to factor in circumstances using their own discretion than exists in Australia or Canada.
American juries (through more gradations in crime such as manslaughter, degrees of murder,
and, in certain cases, application of the death penalty), prosecutors (through deciding what crime
to charge) and legislatures (through mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing grids and
sentencing guidelines),82 determine the length of time a convicted murderer will serve instead of
trial judges.
Most American trial judges have little or no discretion to provide for a suspended or short
murder sentence.83 This may explain why American legal commentators are highly critical of

79

See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, § 3B (Austrl.) (amending Crimes Act, 1958).
But see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (calling into question the
constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines); State v. Barker, 692 N.W.2d 755, 761
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating the way mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing
guidelines have been under sustained attack for years). It was further noted that they finally
appear vulnerable. Id.
81
See Ben Trachtenberg, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 479, 487 (2005).
82
See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-6.1 (2005) (providing that “no portion of the mandatory
minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the
sentencing court.”). This statute, which includes murder and felony murder, is known as
Georgia’s “Seven Deadly Sins” statute. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 137.700 (stating, “the
court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment”). The
statute provides for a minimum sentence of three hundred months (twenty-five years) for murder
and one hundred and twenty months (ten years) for manslaughter. Id. However, there are
certain specific exceptions under OR. REV. STAT. § 137.712 (2003).
83
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1476 n.28
(2001); see also Bill Bishop, Man Who Killed Former Lover Gets Life, EUGENE REG. GUARD,
Feb. 4, 2005, at C3 (demonstrating that a trial judge’s lack of discretion can lead to desired
outcomes). In this case, an Oregon man who brutally killed his ex-girlfriend for breaking off her
relationship with him received a mandatory minimum twenty-five year term after he was
80
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current provocation rules, yet fail to urge that provocation be abolished entirely.84 Abolition is
too risky and punitive for battered women who kill, and perhaps, even for homicides committed
out of rage and jealousy.
Nevertheless, questions remain concerning why two sets of provocation rules that permit
male-bias are so firmly entrenched in the United States. Despite widespread criticism of these
existing rules, traditional provocation,85 and the even more lenient Model Penal Code’s (“MPC”)
extreme emotional disturbance rules (“EED”),86 are still available to men who kill women who
seek to exercise their autonomy through infidelity or leaving.87 Formal equality allows the rare
woman who kills for the same reasons as men to rely on these rules, as well. Substantive
equality is limited to allowing other emotions besides rage and jealousy to be considered.
Particularly troubling for achieving meaningful substantive equality for women is the

convicted of murder by the jury. Id.
84
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 18, at 217-25 (recommending gender switching as a device to enable
juries to recognize their own prejudices); Nourse, supra note 20, at 1395-97 (recommending that
provocation not be allowed when the conduct was lawful); see also Joshua Dressler, Why Keep
the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 963
(2001-02) (recommending modifications to the existing provocation doctrine).
85
See State v. Viera, 787 A.2d 256, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (listing the four
elements of a typical non-MPC provocation rule: (1) the provocation must be adequate; (2) the
defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; (3) the
provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and (4) the defendant must not have
actually cooled off before the slaying); see also LEE, supra note 18, at 25 (describing the
elements of a modern provocation defense as: “(1) the defendant was actually provoked into a
heat of passion, (2) the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been so provoked,
(3) the defendant did not cool off, and (4) the reasonable person in defendant’s shoes would not
have cooled off.”).
86
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (requiring that the jury find that the killer acted:
“under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.”).
87
See Nourse, supra note 20, at 1349.
21

widespread enactment of the MPC, first adopted by the American Law Institute in 1962.88 The
highly subjective EED provision predates the dramatic switch from indeterminate judge-based
sentencing to legislatively mandate determinate sentencing and the social and legal revolution
concerning the rights of women, both of which occurred in the 1970s. The shift to mandatory
sentencing pushes in the direction of allowing the EED’s subjectivity in order that more
defendants can avoid the draconian sentences for murder. In contrast, social norms and the goal
of substantive gender equality make the EED’s similar treatment of battered women who kill and
domestic homicides based on jealous rage seem unjust. The MPC authors’ failure to factor in
how EED impacts women is reflected in the commentaries to the MPC, issued in 1980, which
contain not a hint of concern about its effect on homicides involving infidelity, separation or
domestic violence.89
In addition to determinate sentencing, there may be another reason for American law’s
extreme willingness to allow juries to partially excuse men who kill out of jealousy and rage.
Compared to Australia or Canada, Americans have a greater distrust of government and value
individual over group rights. As Paul Marcus and Vicki Waye observe in an article comparing
Australia’s and America’s criminal justice systems, these different values have led to a much
stronger attachment in the United States to the jury system.90 They note:

88

See LEE, supra note 18, at 33 (stating some form of this provision is in effect in almost half the
states).
89
See MODEL PENAL CODE §210.3 cmts. at 44-65 (1980).
90
See Paul Marcus and Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal
Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 96-97 (2004) (noting that
while Australia and the United States both use the jury system, the United States views the jury
as guaranteeing transparency and accountability while Australia does not view the jury as so
fundamental to the democratic process); see also NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N,
supra note 2, at 3.133.
The jury has traditionally been and remains the appropriate arbiter of community
values. To remove fundamental issues of culpability from the jury and to pass
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From independence, the American jury has been seen as a political weapon. . . .
[In contrast], [a]lthough the jury is also valued in Australia by accused persons for
peer empathy, it is not so highly valued as an essential component of the
democratic system. Except for the most serious criminal cases, jury trials are
rare.91
Similar distinctions can be drawn between Canada and the United States.92
This stronger attachment to letting the jury decide the seriousness of the crime might
make it difficult for Americans to give up the provocation defense altogether. Even if mandatory
minimum sentencing eventually is rejected and, therefore, judges are allowed to tailor sentences
to make them longer or shorter than currently permitted, the provocation defense may not
disappear. Provocation is a classic jury question, one where the jury is asked to determine what
the ordinary person would do under the circumstances. Abolishing provocation would leave this
decision solely to a judge’s discretion in sentencing. Considering the sharp swing away from
broad judicial sentencing discretion, which was the norm up until the 1970s, to highly restricted
judicial discretion today, it is hard to imagine American jurisdictions returning to unfettered
judicial discretion while also abolishing provocation.93
V.

Canadian Provocation Law

them on to the sentencing judge undermines its role. In addition, a jury finding of
manslaughter enables the public to understand why a seemingly lenient sentence
has been proposed. It therefore aids community understanding of the law.
Id.; VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 37-38 (explaining that, in Australia,
concern about loss of jury involvement was one of the more compelling objections made to the
abolition of provocation in Victoria because juries reflect “community values and standards”
which promotes “community confidence in the justice system” and that abolition “would place
too much power in the hands of judges”). But see Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of
Defence of Provocation) Bill 2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House
of Assembly, 59-74 (Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill]
(failing to mention concern about the roles of juries and judges in the discussion in Parliament
before it unanimously abolished provocation).
91
See Marcus & Waye, supra note 90, at 97.
92
See generally Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on the
Criminal Jury, 79 JUDICATURE 249 (1996).
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Even though Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence embraces substantive equality and its
case law urges that non-constitutional issues be determined “in a manner consistent with the
fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution,”94 the law of provocation has remained
distinctly traditional and masculine. Unlike Australia and the United States, Canada has a single
nationwide provocation statute.95 Therefore, there is no room for experimentation with different
provocation rules in different provinces. The federal statute’s language, includes both the term
“heat of passion” and a “no time to cool off” requirement.96 It has been interpreted much like
provocation law in the United States. In other words, it empathizes with men who commit
domestic homicides in the heat of passion.
It is important to note that in Canada, murder carries a mandatory life sentence with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years for first degree and after ten years for second
degree.97 There is a four-year mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter using a firearm98

93

See Trachtenberg, supra note 81, at 484.
Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R.
573, 603.
95
Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 232 (1985).
96
See id. The statute provides that:
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to
manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused
by sudden provocation.
(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for the
purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there
was time for his passion to cool.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the questions (a) whether a particular
wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and (b) whether the accused was
deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation that he alleges he
received, are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given
provocation to another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do.
Id. (emphasis added).
97
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, A CRIME VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
LIFE SENTENCES AND SECTION 745.6 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE (2003), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/
en/ps/voc/guide/sec_m.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005); see also Sheehy, supra note 47, at 530.
94
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and no minimum for other methods of killing.99 Thus, like many American jurisdictions,100 the
sentencing differences between manslaughter and murder are extreme.101 As a consequence,
complete abolition of provocation would result in lengthy murder sentences for both battered
women who kill out of fear and men who kill in the heat of passion who could otherwise,
through a manslaughter conviction, have a much shorter sentence, subject to greater judicial
discretion. Even feminist critics of Canada’s provocation defense, such as the National
Association of Women and the Law, only recommend abolition of provocation if mandatory
minimum sentences for murder are also abolished.102
While it is understandable that, due to mandatory minimum sentencing, abolition of
provocation is currently unthinkable in Canada, it is disturbing that the Canadian Supreme Court
has continued to excuse male rage and jealousy by retaining its expansive reading of heat of
passion to cover situations well beyond those called for by the statute’s language. In 1941, the
Canadian Supreme Court, faced with a statute similar to the one that is in effect today, expanded
provocation to include a situation where a husband was told of his wife’s infidelity and her desire
to leave him.103 This expansion was in line with how courts in other common law countries were
then treating the defense of provocation. More troubling is the post-Charter, 1996 decision, R. v.
98

See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 236(a).
See id. at §236(b).
100
See, e.g., Conn. Stat. Ann. §§53a-35a (2) (mandatory minimum of twenty-five years for
murder); §§53a-35a (4) (mandatory minimum of five years for first-degree manslaughter with a
firearm); §§53a-35a (5) (mandatory minimum of one year for first-degree manslaughter without
a firearm).
101
See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46, § 718.2(a)(ii) (1996) (embodying feminist sentencing
provisions by requiring courts, when sentencing, to consider abuse of “the offender’s spouse or
common-law partner or child” to be an aggravating factor in domestic homicide cases).
102
See, e.g., CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at § 3; accord Gorman, supra note 49, at 479 (stating
that “[i]f the mandatory sentence for murder did not exist, the defence of provocation would
disappear. The outdated thinking found in R. v. Thibert would simply be reflected in
sentencing.”).
99
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Thibert.104 The Thibert facts closely resemble those of the 1990 Australian High Court decision
Stingel, discussed in the next section.105 Both courts applied very similar traditional versions of
provocation law yet reached different outcomes.106
In Thibert the defendant stalked his estranged wife and tried to corner her in her
workplace parking lot.107 When her boyfriend intervened, saying, “Come on big fellow, shoot
me,”108 the defendant shot and killed the man.109 The Canadian Supreme Court required that the
ordinary person “be of the same age, and sex, and share with the accused such other factors as
would give the act or insult in question a special significance.”110 Thus, the Thibert test is quite
subjective, allowing an unlimited number of individual factors to be considered on the issue of
how the ordinary person would respond.111
The Thibert Court viewed marital status and gender as relevant individual factors. It
therefore stated that the standard was “an ordinary person who was a married man, faced with

103

See R. v. Krawchuk, [1941] D.L.R. 353, 358-59 (Can.).
[1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.); see Trotter, supra note 49, at 671 (describing Thibert as “a highly
questionable claim of provocation in a spousal homicide case.”).
105
See infra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
106
See Criminal Code Act, 1924, §160 (Tas.) amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition
of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.) (embodying the provocation statute current when
Stingel was decided). The statute provided:
Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an
ordinary person of the power of self-control, and which, in fact, deprives the
offender of the power of self-control, is provocation, if the offender acts upon it
on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool.
Id.
107
See Thibert, S.C.R. at 52.
108
See id. at 53.
109
See id.
110
See id. at 49.
111
See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.121 (highlighting that
unlike in Australia, “Canadian law does not require the provocation to be sufficient to make the
ordinary person act as the accused did—it is sufficient that the loss of self control be caused by
the provocation.”) (emphasis in the original). The Commission also noted that Canada did not
require proportionality while Australia did. Id.
104
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the break-up of his marriage.”112 The Court further observed, “there is no doubt that the
relationship of the wife of the accused with the deceased was the dominating factor in the tragic
killing.”113 Therefore, it held that the murder conviction must be reversed because a provocation
instruction was required.114
Canada’s provocation statute did not mandate this outcome; its ordinary person test’s
language is strictly objective. In particular, it is disturbing that the Court found the statutory
language that says that provocation cannot be based on something someone has a legal right to
do, did not mean what it said. Acknowledging that “the actions of the deceased . . . were clearly
not prohibited by law,” the Thibert Court still held that, because the deceased’s actions could be
found to be insulting, the law might not approve of them, and therefore, the jury could find the
deceased had no “legal right” to insult the defendant.115 However, as the dissent noted, “no one
has either an emotional or proprietary right or interest in a spouse that would justify the loss of
self-control that the [defendant] exhibited.”116
The Thibert Court did not consider whether substantive equality was satisfied when it held
that provocation could be asserted in this case of killing out of rage and jealousy.117 The
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See Thibert, S.C.R. at 52.
See id. at 50.
114
See id. at 55-56.
115
See id. at 55.
116
See id. at 65 (McClung, J.A., dissenting); cf. Nourse, supra note 20, at 1394-97 (proposing
that provocation only be available for “warranted excuse,” where law or social norms deem the
conduct to be punishable).
117
See Hyland, supra note 49, at 164-65 (using Thibert to discuss formal and substantive
equality). Hyland argues that the majority attempted to balance equality and individual
responsibility but that the Thibert holding “seems to undermine the very principles of equality
and individual responsibility it seeks to uphold.” Id. at 168. Hyland concludes:
The evidence points to Norman Thibert seeking to maintain an unequal
relationship of domination of his wife, a refusal on his part to recognize and
accept her freedom within the relationship, including the freedom to leave it for
another man. In other words, Thibert’s actions leading up to the murder betray
113
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disproportionate impact of the provocation defense on men and women in the context of heat of
passion killings clearly indicates that the heat of passion defense does not satisfy substantive
equality. According to one Canadian commentator, the Canadian Supreme Court in Thibert
“elevate[d] jealous husbands to a class or group with special characteristics that must be
considered when determining if murder was a reasonable response to a deceased’s words.”118
Since this decision, the Canadian Supreme Court has had opportunities to modify its view that
requires provocation be considered in cases of rage and jealousy; it has not done so.119 Clearly,
the Charter’s substantive equality values have had no influence on Canada’s law of provocation.
VI.

Australian Provocation Law
Among the three countries, Australia is the trend-setter on the law of provocation. Both

in its national case law and in the statutes in a number of its states, Australian criminal law has
been much less supportive of traditional provocation doctrine and more willing to incorporate
substantive equality into the law of domestic homicide. In Australia, as in the United States,
each state provides its own statutory or common-law definition of crimes and defenses. Until
the democratic and universal ideal of gender equality, which provide the social
and cultural context within to assess his responsibility for Sherren’s murder.
Id. at 169.
118
See Gorman, supra note 49, at 499.
119
See R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.R. 290, 304 (Can.) (deciding a case where a man stabbed his
nagging wife forty-seven times); see also R. v. Parent, [2001] S.C.R. 761, 763 (Can.) (deciding a
case where a man shot his wife six times during an argument). The non-provocation treatment in
Parent was criticized as avoiding the issue of provocation when in fact it “was more
authentically a case about the operation of the partial defence of provocation in section 232 of
the Criminal Code than about intent.” Trotter, supra note 49, at 688 (emphasis in original). In
contrast to the disappointing response to feminist concerns about provocation, the Canadian
Supreme Court has responded to battered women and self-defense in a way that is more
consistent with its endorsement of substantive equality. See, e.g., R. v. Malott, [1998] S.C.R.
123, 124 (Can.) (stating juries must assess the perceptions of a battered woman who has killed
her abuser in light of the history of her abuse when determining if the woman’s actions were
reasonable); R. v. LaVallee, [1990] S.C.R. 852, 854 (Can.) (permitting an appeal against a guilty
verdict based on expert testimony indicating that battered women can discern when their
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recently, all Australian states provided a partial excuse for killing in the heat of passion.
However, Australian courts and legislatures have become far less willing to excuse domestic
homicides committed in the heat of passion.
In 1995, Australia’s High Court held in Masciantonio v. R. that the rules for provocation
were uniformly traditional throughout Australia.120 The High Court’s test requires the jury to
decide whether the victim’s provocation could cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and
kill.121 Under this test, one might expect that men who commit domestic homicide out of rage or
jealousy would be quite successful in seeking to assert a provocation defense. Surprisingly, the
appellate case law suggests otherwise.
The most important High Court decision concerning provocation in the context of
domestic homicide is Stingel v. R, in which a young man killed his former girlfriend’s current
lover.122 The defendant in Stingel stalked his former girlfriend and found her having sex with

batterers intend life-threatening violence through the cycle of violence).
120
(1995) 129 A.L.R. 575 (Austl.).
121
See id. The test for provocation is:
The provocation must be such that it is capable of causing an ordinary person to
lose self-control and to act in a way in which the accused did. The provocation
must actually cause the accused to lose-self-control and the accused must act
whilst deprived of self-control before he has had the opportunity to regain his
composure.
Id.; see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23 (summarizing the High
Court’s test for provocation as requiring evidence: (1) of something accepted as provocation; (2)
that the accused lost self-control as a result of provocation; and (3) that the provocation was
capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control and form an intent to inflict grievous
bodily harm or death).
122
See (1990) 171 C.L.R. 312 (Austl.) (applying only to Queensland and Western Australia,
states that base provocation statutes on the Griffith Criminal Code enacted in Queensland in
1899 and Western Australia in 1903); see also DESMOND O’CONNOR & P.A. FAIRALL, CRIMINAL
DEFENCES IN AUSTRALIA, PROVOCATION 202 (4th ed. 2005). For more information on the
Griffith Code, see generally The Honourable Sir Harry Gibbs, The Queensland Criminal Code:
From Italy to Zanzibar, July 19, 2002, http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/library/exhibition/crimcode/
20020719_Harry%20Gibbs.pdf.
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her new boyfriend.123 When he told the defendant to “piss off you cunt,” the defendant stabbed
him to death.124 The facts of this case were quite similar to those in the Canadian Supreme
Court’s Thibert case.125 However, unlike the Thibert Court, the Australian High Court held that,
as a matter of law, the ordinary person test was not satisfied.126 Therefore, the Court in Stingel
found that the trial court’s refusal to give a provocation instruction was correct.127 The Court
concluded, “no jury, acting reasonably, could fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
the [defendant’s] reaction to the conduct of the deceased fell far below the minimum limits of the
range of powers of self-control which must be attributed to any hypothetical ordinary nineteenyear-old.”128 This decision was based on Tasmania’s then existing provocation statute,129 which
the High Court noted was similar to Canada’s federal provocation statute.130
The High Court set out a hybrid two-step test for provocation that has been widely
criticized in Australia as being too complex and hard to follow.131 After factoring in any relevant
personal characteristics of the defendant in determining the gravity of the provocation, the only
attribute of the defendant that is to be considered in deciding whether such provocation could
cause an ordinary person to lose control is the defendant’s age.132 Compared to provocation tests
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See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 317-18. Killing the male lover is another all too common form of
domestic homicide.
124
See id. at 319-20.
125
See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
126
See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 336-37.
127
See id.
128
Id. at 337-38.
129
See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (repealed 2003) (stating that a jury could find
manslaughter if the accused caused death “in the heat of passion” caused by “any wrongful act or
insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control.”); see also
Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 320.
130
See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 320-21.
131
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 5, at 34-35.
132
See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 329.
30

used in the United States133 and Canada,134 Australia’s test is somewhat less subjective because
the accused’s gender and other personal characteristics are not as fully factored in to how an
ordinary person would respond to the provocation.135 Applying this test, numerous Australian
lower appellate courts have also upheld trial courts’ refusals to give provocation instructions in
cases involving male rage and jealousy, including cases involving husbands killing their
wives.136 Some of these cases openly acknowledge that the provocation defense is genderbiased.137 Thus, it appears that Australian courts, when faced with a traditional provocation rule,
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See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (measuring the defendant’s reaction
to his victim’s alleged provocation against that of “an ordinary man of average disposition.”);
accord People v. Lujan, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
134
See, e.g., R. v. Thibert, [1996] D.L.R. (4th) 675, 683 (Can.) (summarizing that the ordinary
person test should consider the accused’s age, sex and “other factors” in order to determine the
reasonableness of the loss of self-control). But see R. v. Hill, [1986] S.C.R. 313, 314 (Can.)
(affirming that age and gender were the only necessary factors to be considered for the ordinary
person test in this gay panic case). Hill is the basis for the test applied in Stingel; however,
Australia limits the test to age only, not gender. Id. See generally Morgan, supra note 2, at 258.
135
See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 331 (holding that the ordinary person test can include the age of the
accused and that other relevant qualifying attributes may be considered when evaluating the
gravity of the provocation); see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 5, at 25-26
(providing an example of how this test would be applied). For example,
[I]f a [thirty-three]-year-old white man with a stutter killed his estranged wife
after she had made disparaging remarks about him and teased him about his
stutter, in determining the gravity of the provocation, the jury may consider how
an ordinary [thirty-three]-year-old white man with a stutter might have viewed
those comments. The jury would then have to consider how an ordinary adult not
sharing any of the accused’s characteristics, such as his stutter or sex, might have
reacted to provocation of that gravity.
Id.
136
See, e.g., Hart v. The Queen (2003) 139 A. Crim. R. 520, 545 (Austl.) (affirming the trial
court’s conclusion that the appellant husband failed to demonstrate any issue of provocation
when he killed his estranged wife after seeing her kiss another man); R. v. Kumar (2002) 133 A.
Crim. R. 245, ¶ 3 (Austl.) (affirming the trial court’s withdrawal of provocation from the jury
where a husband killed his de facto wife after she insulted him); see also R. v. Leonboyer (2001)
V.S.C.A. 149, ¶ 72 (Austl.) (affirming the trial judge’s conclusion not to leave provocation to the
jury where a man killed his girlfriend after allegedly hearing of her infidelity). But see R. v.
Yasso (2004) V.S.C.A. 127, ¶¶ 48-50 (Austl.) (granting an appeal against applicant husband’s
murder conviction to allow the defense of provocation to be open to the jury).
137
See Yasso, V.S.C.A. at ¶ 43 (acknowledging that it is justifiable to assert that the provocation
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usually look unfavorably on allowing provocation in cases of male rage and jealousy.138
There are exceptions, however. Recently, an Australian jury in Victoria was instructed
on and accepted a provocation claim by James Ramage, who killed his wife Julie because she
told him that she had found someone else and that sex with Ramage repulsed her.139 The jury
verdict and the eleven-year sentence led to national outcry and public debate over the
appropriateness of the provocation defense.140 During this debate, the Victorian Law Reform
Commission released its final report on defenses to homicide that included a recommendation
that the state parliament abolish provocation entirely.141 In January 2005, the political leader of
Victoria, Acting Premier John Thwaites, promised to introduce legislation to abolish the
defense;142 in November 2005, the Victorian Parliament abolished provocation.143 Previously,
Tasmania was the first Australian state to abolish the defense, in 2003.144

defense is “imbued with gender bias”); see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 255 (discussing gender
bias in provocation cases).
138
See, e.g., R. v. Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A. Crim. R. 1 (Austl.) (citing Stingel and extending
the provocation defense to battered women, even where the battered woman killed her batterer
while he was asleep).
139
See Victoria Considers Reform of Provocation Defense (ABC radio broadcast Dec. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1261755.htm (describing anger and
political mobilization in Victoria due to the reduced sentence given to James Ramage, who killed
his estranged wife); see also R. v. Butay (2001) V.S.C. 417, ¶ 2 (Austl.) (finding the husband
guilty of manslaughter by way of provocation because his wife taunted him about her affair);
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 280-81 (discussing Butay as part of a case
study).
140
See Govt Abolishes Provocation Defence, THE AGE (Austl.), Jan. 20, 2005 [hereinafter Govt
Abolishes] (noting that Julie Ramage’s death became a focal point for reform with more than
3,500 letters sent to her family urging government action); see also Ian Munro, The World’s Best
Justice?, THE AGE (Austl.), Nov. 17, 2004, at A3, 4.
141
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 20.
142
See Press Release, Office of Premier, Abolition of Provocation as a Defence to Homicide
(Jan. 21, 2005 Austl.) (on file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy &
the Law).
143
See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, § 3B (Austrl.) (amending Crimes Act, 1958).
144
See Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.), amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of
Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.).
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Australia is the only country in which any of its jurisdictions have abolished provocation
altogether.145 It is not a coincidence that Victoria and Tasmania are two of the four Australian
states that have abolished mandatory minimum sentencing for murder.146 The ability of trial
judges to tailor murder sentences,147 along with concerns about the provocation defense’s
unfairness to women,148 were influential in both states’ decisions. However, while both states
have justified abolition by focusing on judicial discretion in sentencing as a substitute for the
ameliorating effect of the provocation defense in some intentional homicide cases, their
approaches to abolition differ.
145

See Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Austl.) (demonstrating that the Commonwealth of Australia
does not have a provocation defense as part of its criminal law). Because the Commonwealth
has never had a provocation defense, it is technically the first jurisdiction not to allow
provocation. However, since homicide is rarely prosecuted as a federal crime, the lack of a
provocation defense has little practical impact.
146
See Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.) (containing no mandatory minimum sentence for murder in
New South Wales); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (containing no mandatory
minimum sentence for murder in the Australian Capital Territory); VICTORIAN LAW REFORM
COMM’N, supra note 6, at 51 (discussing both states’ modified provocation rules that make it
easier for battered women to assert the defense); see also infra notes 238-239 and accompanying
text.
147
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 33 (asserting that because judges can
tailor sentences, provocation should be taken into account at sentencing along with other
mitigating factors instead of existing as an independent defense). See generally Remarks on
Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90.
148
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 27-28; see also Govt Abolishes, supra
note 140 (quoting Victoria’s Attorney-General Rob Hulls as saying: “[p]rovocation is a hangover
from a bygone era where women were actually treated as chattels.”). The debate in the
Tasmanian Parliament was more divided. The Attorney General Judith Jackson, who introduced
the bill to abolish provocation, spoke explicitly about provocation being “gender biased and
unjust.” See Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90, at 60. However, two
of the three legislators who commented on the bill, Michael Hodgman and Mr. McKim, while
supporting it, expressly rejected gender-bias as a reason for repeal. Id. Their responses were in
terms of formal equality, arguing that both women and men use the defense and are capable of
similar violence. Id. However, like the Victorian Law Reform Commission, the Model Criminal
Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General cited gender bias as a
major reason for its recommendation that the provocation defense be abolished. See MODEL
CRIMINAL CODE, OFFICERS COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL,
DISCUSSION PAPER, MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, CH. 5, FATAL OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON 103
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A. Victoria’s Approach
In addition to abolishing provocation, the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s
recommendations included reintroducing the partial defense of excessive self-defense.149 It did
this for the express purpose of allowing those battered women who kill, but who are unable to
obtain an acquittal for self-defense because their response to their fear was found unreasonable,
to still be able to prove the lesser crime of manslaughter.150 One reason for urging the
reintroduction of excessive self-defense was to influence battered women who, under the then
existing system, might choose to plead guilty to manslaughter based on provocation out of
concern that going to trial on self-defense could result in a murder conviction. The Commission
believed that after the abolition of provocation such women would more likely risk going to trial
on self-defense, knowing that a jury could find the back-up partial defense of excessive selfdefense.151 Thus, under the Commission’s proposal, manslaughter would be available for fear,

(June 1998) [hereinafter MODEL CRIMINAL CODE].
149
See Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecution (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, ¶ 13 (Austl.) (abandoning the
excessive self-defense doctrine because the difficulty and risk of error in applying it to the facts
of a given case proved greater than any advantages of its use).
150
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 269. Recently, a simplified modern
version of excessive self-defense was enacted in New South Wales which provides:
(1) This section applies if: (a) the person uses force that involves the infliction of
death, and (b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he
or she perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary: (c) to
defend himself or herself or another person, or (d) to prevent or terminate the
unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty of another person.
(2) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder,
the person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise
criminally responsible for manslaughter.
Crimes Act 1900, § 421 (N.S.W.). Excessive self-defense has an American analogue in the
partial defense of imperfect self-defense, which is allowed in a minority of American
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heatof-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1707-08 (1986).
151
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 102 (acknowledging that this
decision could backfire, and a jury that would otherwise have acquitted based on self-defense,
might opt for excessive self-defense instead, resulting in a manslaughter conviction).
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the emotion that motivates more women who commit domestic homicide, but no longer allowed
for rage and jealousy, the emotions that motivate more men who commit domestic homicide. As
the Commission noted: “Excessive self-defence would seem to better fit the circumstances of
women who kill in this context than . . . the existing partial defence of provocation . . . [because
t]here is no need, as for provocation, to establish that the accused acted due to a ‘loss of selfcontrol’.”152
The Victorian Parliament heeded the Commission’s advice, but instead of reintroducing
the partial excuse of excessive self-defense, it enacted a new crime called “defensive
homicide.”153 This crime has no minimum sentence and provides a maximum sentence of
twenty years;154 the same penalty that applied to the manslaughter based on provocation before it
was abolished.155 Defensive homicide is committed when a person kills another while believing
the conduct was necessary to defend herself or another from death or “really serious injury”
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See id.
[Defensive homicide is] similar in some ways to the common-law rule of
‘excessive self-defence’ that existed prior to 1987 but was abolished by the High
Court’s decision in Zecevic’s case.
Under the earlier common-law rule of excessive self-defence, and the provisions
of other jurisdictions, a person who has a genuine belief that his or her conduct is
necessary in self-defence, but who is not considered to have acted reasonably is
guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter. However, there could be confusion
about the basis of the jury’s verdict, as there were several potentially inconsistent
ways that a jury could reach a manslaughter verdict. The new offence of
defensive homicide will clearly indicate the basis of the jury’s verdict to the
sentencing judge. This will enable the sentencing judge to impose a sentence that
accurately reflects the crime that the person committed.
Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian Legislative
Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1789 (Oct. 27, 2005) (statement of Honourable J.M. Madden,
Minister f153 See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, §§ 4, 9AD (Austrl.) (amending
Crimes Act, 1958).
or Sport and Recreation).
154
See Crimes (Homicide) Act at § 9AD.
155
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 274.
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where she did not have reasonable grounds for this belief.156 This new crime was enacted to
address family violence situations where the defendant killed out of fear but is unable to meet the
reasonableness requirement for self-defense.157 As Attorney General Rob Hulls noted in his
discussion of this crime before the Legislative Assembly: “This is a reform that is aimed at
removing entrenched bias and misogynist assumptions from the law to make sure that women
who kill while genuinely believing it is the only way to protect themselves or their children are
not condemned as murderers.”158
The Victorian Parliament’s abolition of provocation and enactment of the new offense of
defensive homicide are clear examples of lawmakers choosing to substitute substantive for
formal gender equality.159 As a result, the punishment for defensive homicide will be similar to
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See Crimes (Homicide) Act at §§ 9AC, 9AD.
Most commentators describe provocation as a partial excuse because the actor is not entirely
to blame for what happened: He either could not control his desire to kill, or demanding such
control would be unfair in light of the provocation. A few commentators describe provocation as
a partial justification because the adequately provoked killer’s conduct has committed a lesser
crime than one who intentionally kills without provocation. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s
Puzzle, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1677, 1680-82, 1693-00 (2005); see also LEE, supra note 18, at 227-30.
The new crime of defensive homicide is a lesser crime than murder that appears to be a partial
justification because the killing, though unreasonable, was committed for the morally defensible
motive of fear.
158
Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian Legislative
Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1844 (Oct. 26, 2005) (statement of Honourable R.J. Hulls, Attorney
General, Minister for Industrial Relations and Minister for Planning). Other provisions of the
Crimes (Homicide) Bill also were adopted with family violence in mind: First, self defense was
codified in § 9AC and a special provision, § 9AH(1) provides rules concerning lack of
immediacy and excessive force that apply solely where family violence is alleged. Second, §
9AH(2)-(4) expressly describes certain kinds of evidence that may be introduced in domestic
homicide cases. See Crimes (Homicide) Act at §§ 9AC, 9AH(1)-(4).
159
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 15 (providing a substantive equality
rationale for its recommendations). The Commission noted:
Defences and/or partial defences to homicide should not be based on abstract
philosophical principles, but should reflect the context in which homicides
typically occur. In particular, the law should deal fairly with both men and
women who kill and defences should be constructed in a way that take account of
the fact they tend to kill in different circumstances.
157
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what was available through provocation to battered women who kill but are unable to prove they
acted in self-defense. However, punishment for people who kill out of anger and possessiveness
may be substantially greater under a murder conviction than it was when provocation made the
lesser crime of manslaughter available to them. Victoria’s new laws provide an opportunity to
determine whether expressly feminist legislation that seeks to provide substantive equality, in
practice changes how men and women who kill out of jealousy and anger, or fear and despair,
are treated by a common law criminal justice system.
B. Tasmania’s Approach
The Tasmanian approach to abolishing provocation differed substantially from that of
Victoria. While there had been cases160 and commentary161 demonstrating that Tasmania’s
traditional provocation rule could produce distressingly male-biased results,162 there was no law
reform report or specific case that provided either a feminist or other impetus for eliminating the
defense of provocation. Furthermore, unlike the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Tasmanian
Attorney General Judith Jackson’s proposal to abolish provocation was unaccompanied by any

Id.
160

See, e.g., Hutton v. The Queen, (1986) 20 A. Crim. R. 315 (Austl.) (expanding the scope of
provocation in cases involving male rage and jealousy) discussed in detail infra, notes 208-212,
and accompanying text; see also R. v. Franke (Aug. 22, 1984) 2 (Tas.) (on file with the
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law) (convicting a battered woman
of manslaughter). In this case, preceding Hutton, the defendant was being sexually assaulted by
her husband with the handle of a claw hammer when she seized it, struck and killed him, and
then disposed of the body. Id. at 3. The decedent was reported to have been cruel to defendant
and their children. Id. The Court accepted that defendant “lost the power of self-control and
caused her husband’s death in the heat of sudden provocation.” Id.; see also Bradfield, supra
note 30, at 15. The defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment. KATE WARNER,
SENTENCING IN TASMANIA 275, n.43 (2d ed. 2002).
161
See, e.g., Bradfield, supra note 30, at 5-7.
162
On the other hand, Tasmania was the jurisdiction out of which Stingel arose. The trial judge
and Tasmanian appellate court both held that a provocation instruction should not have been
allowed. See Stanley M. H. Yeo, Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism, 14
SYDNEY L. REV. 3, 3 (1992).
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other recommendations.163 Instead, Jackson, as a Member of Parliament for the majority Labor
Party, simply brought her proposal to abolish provocation to Parliament for their
consideration.164 She asserted that abolition would not “in any way” be detrimental to battered
women.165 After a lively discussion, the Tasmania Parliament voted unanimously to abolish
provocation.166
Tasmania’s abolition of provocation appears to be a positive step on behalf of women.
The shift in power from the jury to the judge assumes that judges, through sentencing discretion,
will be more likely to punish severely those murderers who kill out of rage and jealousy while
providing only light sentences when murderers are battered women who kill out of fear. It
remains to be seen whether this assumption proves correct. Especially uncertain is how battered
women, who would have previously relied on provocation, will fare without this defense. Will
the lack of either this backup partial defense, or a substitute such as the defensive homicide
crime enacted in Victoria, cause more battered women to go to trial on complete self-defense
because the only option for a plea is murder?167 Will juries convict them of murder or, instead,
be more inclined than when provocation was a middle ground, to acquit them based on complete
self-defense?168 Because Tasmania has so few homicides, these concerns are unlikely to be
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See Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90 (indicating that the Attorney
General had the support of the Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Ellis, in his 200001 report where he questioned retaining provocation).
164
See id.
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
Diminished responsibility, another partial defense that is often used to reduce murder to
manslaughter in the domestic homicide context, is not available in either Tasmania or Victoria.
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6.
168
See Rebecca Bradfield, The Demise of Provocation in Tasmania, 27 CRIM. L.J. 322, 324
(2003).
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resolved for some time.169
Two effects of Victoria’s and Tasmania’s abolition of provocation are clear. Juries no
longer have a say in the assessment of culpability among those killers committing intentional
homicide based on heat of passion. Furthermore, killers who previously would not have been
labeled murderers will now bear that label. The difference, however, between the two states is
that in Tasmania both heat of passion and fear-based domestic homicides will be treated as
murder while Victoria will allow juries to find a lesser crime for the fear-based homicides.
In a few years time a comparison can be made between the domestic homicide decisions
and sentencing in Victoria and Tasmania and also between their outcomes and those in
jurisdictions that retain the provocation defense. It may then be possible to determine whether
Victoria’s lesser crime of defensive homicide is beneficial for battered women and therefore
whether it is important of provide such an alternative to murder instead of simply, as in
Tasmania, abolishing provocation. Whether it is beneficial will depend on what prosecutors and
juries do. Will Victorian prosecutors and juries simply substitute defensive homicide for
provocation, and therefore, routinely find this lesser crime or will they more frequently opt for
acquittal based on complete self-defense?170 Will prosecutors and juries in Tasmania more
frequently opt for murder or complete self-defense for battered women who kill? In time, it
should also become apparent in both states whether judges are sentencing men who murder in
the heat of passion more severely than was the case for similarly situated men who were
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previously convicted of manslaughter.171
The abolition of provocation is unlikely to sweep Australia. The critical reason is that
while no Australian state has a mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter, unlike Victoria
and Tasmania, some Australian states have mandatory minimum sentences for murder.172
Abolishing provocation leaves only the options of acquittal or murder unless some other basis for
manslaughter such as excessive self-defense or a lesser crime such as defensive homicide is
created. The mandatory sentencing requirement for murder then prevents judges from tailoring
murder sentences to take into account circumstances surrounding the killing, such as whether
there was any violent provocation or merely an attempt to exercise sexual autonomy or leave the
relationship.
VII.

Changing Social Norms
Even though the criminal law doctrine differs, sometimes dramatically, social norms

appear to be affecting the outcomes in domestic homicide cases involving heat of passion and
fear in all three countries. For example, while substantive equality has had little influence on the
statutes and appellate case law in Canada concerning the heat of passion basis for provocation,
its impact on sentencing in Canadian cases indicates that excusing men who kill in a jealous rage
has become less socially acceptable. Once a jury finds provocation, Canada only minimally
restricts sentencing discretion173 and therefore judges can factor in the circumstances
surrounding the killing in deciding the appropriate punishment to impose. Currently, Canadian
judges appear to be sentencing men who kill out of rage and jealousy quite differently than they
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sentence battered women who kill. In a recent Canadian case study, men who successfully used
provocation in plea-bargaining or at trial were sentenced to six to twelve years, with no man
receiving less than two years.174 In contrast, most of the women who successfully used
provocation received sentences ranging from two years to suspended sentences; the longest
sentence for any woman was five years.175 Thus, because of the flexibility of sentencing for
manslaughter in Canada, judges are tailoring the punishment in provocation cases to fit the
crime.
There have been similar sentencing outcomes in provocation cases in Australia.176 One
Australian study found that the average sentence length for women guilty of manslaughter was
three to five years.177 In contrast, the average length for men guilty of manslaughter was six to
eight years.178 The study also found that thirty-three percent of the women received noncustodial sentences, compared with ten percent of the men.179 The likely reason for the different
sentences for men and women is that existing provocation rules are at odds with the social norms
concerning both killing out of possessiveness and anger and killing out of fear and despair.
Further evidence that provocation rules do not represent current values is provided by Rebecca
Bradfield’s study, discussed earlier, where battered women were highly successful in their use of
provocation while men who killed in the heat of passion were much more likely to be found
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guilty of murder.180
Substantive equality may be making inroads in the United States as well. Because of the
evolution of social norms concerning appropriate responses to sexual jealousy, I suspect that
juries, and prosecutors through plea-bargaining, are today more likely to opt for murder over
manslaughter for rage-based domestic killings than in the past.181 A recent study of extreme
emotional disturbance (EED) pleas and verdicts in New York City by Kirschner, Litwack and
Galperin, provides intriguing evidence supporting this suspicion.182 This study looked at all
cases where defendants pleaded EED to “charges of intentional murder or attempted intentional
murder in New York County over a [ten]-year period (1988-1997).”183 The authors’ “major
finding” was “that jurors, judges, and prosecutors were much more likely to accept a defense of
EED when the defendant’s homicidal behavior was motivated significantly by an understandable
fear . . . than when the defendant acted out of anger without fear of physical harm.”184
The sample in the study was small, consisting of twenty-four cases where defendants
argued EED in murder.185 Nine defendants were found guilty of, or pled guilty to, manslaughter;
fifteen were found guilty of, or pled guilty to, murder.186 Only two of the twenty-four were
female; they both pled guilty to manslaughter in cases where the dominating emotion was fear
rather than anger.187 Only one of the nine manslaughter outcomes involved a man committing a
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domestic homicide.188 In contrast, ten of the fifteen cases where the outcome was murder
involved men committing domestic homicides where the dominating emotion was anger.189
Overall, the authors noted that “[i]n no case in our sample was pure rage viewed as
reasonable.”190
The authors noted that the concern that EED allowed cases of killing out of
possessiveness and rage to reach the jury was justified.191 However, based on their findings, they
suggested, “the problems [that commentators] perceive with the EED defense may be problems
in theory rather than in practice.”192 They also noted that New York appellate decisions have
upheld jury or judicial verdicts rejecting EED in heat of passion domestic homicide cases.193
Finally, they pointed out that New York appellate courts have also upheld trial judges’ refusals to
allow a jury to consider EED in such domestic homicide cases.194
Further empirical research is needed to determine whether these findings from one county
in New York are representative of how prosecutors, juries and judges are applying the
provocation defense and EED in United States’ jurisdictions. Considering the changes in recent
years in the acceptability of jealous rage compared to fear as bases for a manslaughter
outcome,195 however, it seems likely that these findings are representative. In particular, since
the EED defense is more sympathetic to defendants than traditional provocation, one would
expect similar pro-fear and anti-jealousy results when a provocation defense was used. If this
turns out to be correct, it will mean that while juries are still being allowed to find manslaughter
188
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in domestic homicide cases based on rage and those based on fear, the latter emotion is much
more likely to lead to a manslaughter verdict. Thus, substantive gender equality may be
occurring in practice even though it does not appear to be in theory. However, so long as
determinate sentencing continues to be the norm in the United States, any attempt at substantive
equality will be a blunt instrument. Fear-based killings may more likely result in a substantial
sentence for manslaughter (when acquittal based on self-defense is the fairer outcome), while
killings out of possessiveness may more likely result in a much longer sentence for murder.
Another indicia of changing social norms include public outcry concerning publicized
cases where killing in the heat of passion results in a manslaughter verdict. For example, the
Ramage case, discussed earlier,196 galvanized Victoria’s political leadership to seek to abolish
provocation.197 In Canada, there also has been adverse public reaction to several high profile
cases where men who committed domestic homicide out of jealousy and rage were able to rely
on the provocation defense.198 Perhaps the most famous American case in recent years that led to
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public outcry about men who kill in the heat of passion were the murders of OJ Simpson’s exwife and her male friend. Even though Simpson was acquitted because the State did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the killer (but later found him civilly liable for both
victims’ wrongful deaths), the evidence presented as to motive provided a classic example of
provocation of a violent, jealous and possessive man.199
The recent negative public responses to, and harsher sentencing of men who kill in the
heat of passion, is based on a significant shift in values over the past half-century. In the midtwentieth century, the law of provocation in Australia, Canada and the United States, became
substantially more subjective and individualized,200 thereby, making the defense available to
more killers by allowing juries to consider various aspects of their “human frailty.”201 The
killers in the 1940s through 1980s for whom the broader subjective definition of provocation was
created were overwhelmingly male.
Language in the 1963 Australia High Court opinion in Parker v. R202 demonstrates the
use of changing values rationale for such expansion. The wife of the defendant Parker had left
him for another man, Dan Kelly.203 Parker’s wife and Kelly had departed together and were
traveling on a public street when Parker, who pursued them, seriously injured his wife and killed
Kelly.204 Relying on the defendant’s “human frailty” Chief Justice Dixon noted:
We are not living in the conditions of the sixteenth, seventeenth or eighteenth
century. According to the standards governing our society in the later nineteenth
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199
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century and the twentieth century the succession of events and the conduct of Dan
Kelly brought a very strong provocation to an emotional nature, a provocation
still in actual operation when Parker came upon Dan Kelly with his wife.205
Chief Justice Dixon ended up in the dissent in the High Court’s decision in Parker; however, his
view was vindicated when this case was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council.206 Throughout
the 1960s through the 1980s, a number of Australian commentators advocated that the law of
provocation become more subjective, taking into account the emotional equation of the
individual killer who killed in the heat of passion. As Stanley Yeo noted in an article published
in 1987, “judges, reform commissioners and academic commentators alike have called for
[elimination of the objective test] and replacement by a purely subjective test.”207
There are clear indications that some lawmakers are currently responding to a different
social climate that is more sensitive to gender inequalities and less tolerant of the emotions of
possessive rage and jealousy. The dramatically different view and corresponding legal treatment
of provocation in Australia today, compared to twenty to fifty years ago, demonstrates this point.
In Tasmania, as recently as 1986, the highest state appellate court reversed the decision
by the trial court, which had refused to allow the defendant to argue provocation.208 The
defendant had shot and killed the woman he had been living with, who was married to another
man at the time, and her new lover in a sudden rage.209 In its unanimous reversal, the court
substantially broadened its interpretation of the statutory language, “wrongful act or insult,”210 to
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allow the defendant’s former lover’s “scornful laugh” to provide sufficient insult to require
consideration of provocation in both homicide cases.211 In defending this expansion, the court
explained, “changing community values may render conduct not considered sufficient to raise
the defence in one age sufficient in another to deprive an ordinary person of the power of selfcontrol.”212
Seventeen years after this decision, the Tasmanian Parliament unanimously abolished
provocation.213 Attorney General Judith Jackson (a member of the majority Labor Party)
explained that “[t]he law has changed and society has changed. An outdated and inappropriate
defence for murder should not be retained in the twenty-first century.”214 The leaders of the
minority Liberal and Green parties also voiced their support for the abolition of provocation.215
These leaders expressly noted that their support was based how society had changed and argued
that provocation’s “concession to human frailty” was neither a necessity nor “consistent with the
expectations of a civilised society” especially in light of Tasmania’s abolition of a mandatory life
sentence for murder.216
What had happened between 1986 and 2003 that led lawmakers to go from expanding the
application of provocation to abolition? One major change during this time has been the
growing awareness and understanding by lawmakers and the public about gender inequality and
(Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.).
211
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domestic violence. The other was the abolition of the mandatory life sentence for murder.
The recent Victorian Law Reform Commission’s report combined with the adverse
public and political reaction to the Ramage case is further evidence of how domestic homicide in
the heat of passion is no longer viewed as deserving of compassion and empathy in Australia.
The Commission’s Report, in urging that provocation be abolished, emphasized the changed
values of the twenty-first century:
Historically, an angry response to a provocation might have been excusable, but
in the 21st century, the Victorian community has a right to expect people will
control their behaviour, even when angry or emotionally upset—particularly when
the consequences are as serious as homicide.217
It also emphasized that the provocation defense is gender-biased:
[P]rovocation is most often raised by men in the context of a relationship of
sexual intimacy in circumstances involving jealousy or an apparent desire to
retain control. The continued existence or availability of provocation in these
circumstances may therefore be seen as sending an unacceptable message—that
men’s anger and use of violence against women is legitimate and excusable.
Some people have questioned ‘how, in a supposedly “civilised” society, can the
desire to leave a relationship constitute behaviour which would provoke anyone to
kill?’218
The political leaders of Victoria agreed with the Commission’s views on both changed
social norms and gender bias. Attorney-General Rob Hulls stated, “the justice system had to be
brought up to date with modern community values.”219 He also noted, “[p]rovocation is a
hangover from a bygone era where women were actually treated as chattels.”220 The Acting
Premier John Thwaites echoed the Attorney-General, noting that “the law of provocation was an
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anachronism that no longer had a place in modern, civilised society.”221 He added that the
“provocation defence was gender-biased and it promoted a blame-the-victim culture.”222 The
Age, the leading newspaper in Victoria, in an editorial, also agreed that social norms no longer
can tolerate the defense of provocation, describing it as “archaic” and urging it be
“abandoned.”223 The editorial noted, “we no longer live in a time when ‘hot-blooded’ male
violence is considered acceptable.”224 It concluded that “the law should reflect a society’s
values” and, therefore, “[c]hange in this area is long overdue.”225
The Parliamentary debate in Victoria over abolishing provocation also frequently referred
to changing social values. One legislator, after referring to the Ramage case, noted that abolition
“is essential in bringing our laws into line with community thinking and standards.”226 Another
legislator said that abolition was “yet another step forward in the removal of that old-fashioned
view that women were property and therefore men could do with women what they wished.”227
Yet another commented that “[t]he law surrounding defences to homicide have not kept up with
the pace of social change and changes to social values.”228
As the studies of sentencing, plea-bargaining and jury verdicts indicate, the change in
social values in Tasmania and Victoria has also occurred in other Australian states, and in
Canada and the United States. Yet abolition of provocation has occurred in two Australian states
221
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without a mandatory life sentence for murder but not in any state that does impose such a
sentence. This suggests that the will to incorporate substantive equality into the criminal law
surrounding domestic homicide exists, but not at the price of increasing the risk of a life sentence
for murder for either women who kill out of fear or, perhaps, even for men who kill out of anger
and jealousy. Because of the lack of mandatory minimum sentences for manslaughter in other
Australian states and only modest minimum manslaughter sentences in Canada, trial judges have
been able to incorporate these social values and the resulting substantive equality into the
sentencing discretion that judges have once provocation has been found. In the United States,
which provides a greater variety of determinate sentencing for both murder and manslaughter,
there is less ability to provide women who kill out of fear, but fail to prove self-defense, to be
given a non-custodial or very short sentence. Therefore, the values favoring people who kill out
of fear and disfavoring people who kill out of anger and possessiveness may mainly be reflected
in jury verdicts and plea bargains.229
VIII.

Is Abolition of Provocation Necessary?
There is much to be said for allowing juries to decide the provocation issue rather than

leaving it solely to judges through sentencing discretion as has been done in Tasmania through
its abolition of provocation. There is even reason for concern when the only emotion to be
considered in allowing a lesser offence to be decided by a jury is fear, as has been done in
Victoria. Professor Cynthia Lee in her book, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and
Fear in the Criminal Courtroom, provides a number of reasons why juries should still be allowed
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to find provocation.230 Most convincing is her claim concerning the civic educational value of
juries deciding provocation.231 She notes that “[j]urors should be encouraged to deliberate
explicitly about social norms, stereotypes, and bias when deciding what constitutes reasonable
provocation . . . [because they] deliver . . . commonsense justice . . . [and] serve as a bulwark
against overzealous government prosecutors and cynical judges.”232
While reviewing Lee’s, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the
Criminal Courtroom, I considered whether to recommend abolishing provocation.233 Lee’s
argument for continuing to include the jury in the normative decision of how to treat men who
kill out of rage and jealousy helped convince me that abolition is probably the wrong response.
Both Lee and I prefer that the court educate the jury about the gender and other biases stemming
from existing social norms that provocation law elicits.234 Our goal is to enable the jury to
recognize the prejudices that exist in our society, and thereby, encourage them to empathize with
parties who are not from the traditionally dominant groups.
Very few courts do the kind of explicit gender and other-bias education of the jury that
Lee and I advocate.235 However, perhaps this is less necessary than in the past. The provocation
rules in the United States, Canada and much of Australia continue to represent formal gender
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equality that allows jury empathy for men who kill in a jealous rage. Nevertheless, changes in
social norms have allowed substantive gender equality to be incorporated in provocation law’s
application by juries, as well as judges and prosecutors. When given the choice between
manslaughter and murder for battered women who kill, juries prefer manslaughter; in contrast
when given that choice for killings in the heat of passion, juries prefer murder.236 Therefore, in
jurisdictions with mandatory minimum sentences for murder, domestic homicide law may be as
fair and equal as is currently possible. Until judges are given greater discretion in sentencing,
and the law and application of self-defense is more understanding of battered women’s
situations, current provocation law, as applied, may be the best that it can be.
Now that two common law jurisdictions have abolished provocation it is particularly
important to consider whether abolition is in fact the most effective method for achieving
maximum substantive gender equality. In addition to leaving a traditional jury function to judges
and legislatures, abolition runs two risks concerning domestic homicides: juries acquitting
jealous killers rather than convicting them for murder, and juries convicting battered women of
murder instead of acquitting them. Finally, it labels all convicted intentional killers, including
battered women, as murderers.237 While replacing provocation with excessive/imperfect selfdefense or Victoria’s new crime of defensive homicide that only apply to killing out of fear
solves half the problem, it leaves only an all or nothing solution for people who kill in the heat of
passion regardless of whether the killing was a domestic homicide or not.
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Canada and some Australian states’ current treatment, which allows juries to find
provocation that results in a manslaughter verdict and then gives trial judges broad discretion to
tailor the sentence, may, in fact, work better than abolition, so long as most prosecutors, juries
and judges have embraced the view that jealousy and rage are less deserving emotions than fear
and despair. Jurisdictions that have enlightened provocation rules may provide greater
protection for battered women who kill while also allowing severe punishment of people who
kill out of possessiveness. In particular, two Australian jurisdictions, Australian Capital
Territory238 and New South Wales,239 may have the best solution currently possible. Both have
provocation statutes that have attempted to account for the problems battered women who kill
face when trying to claim provocation. In addition, neither has a mandatory minimum sentence
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for manslaughter or murder. Thus, regardless of whether a jury finds a battered woman guilty of
manslaughter or murder, the trial judge still has the ability to tailor the sentence to take her
circumstances into account.
While changes in the law of provocation may no longer be as crucial to assuring
substantive gender equality, even greater efforts should be made to ensure battered women
receive substantive equality under self-defense law so that more often, when battered women kill
out of fear, they are either not charged or are acquitted. Unfortunately, regardless of enlightened
reforms of both provocation and self-defense rules, social norms, or as Wendy Williams calls
them, “cultural limits,” may continue to stand in the way of complete substantive equality for
battered women.240 Prosecutors, judges and jurors may still refuse to fully excuse intentional
killing based on fear where the killing occurs outside the traditional male-biased circumstances
for which self-defense was designed, making retention of a manslaughter-like option necessary,
whether it be provocation, excessive/imperfect self-defense241 or defensive homicide.
Conclusion
Currently, in determining the severity of the punishment for domestic homicides based on
jealous rage or fear, the emphasis is on different legal actors in different jurisdictions. Some
Australian states, by abolishing provocation, are limiting the participation of the jury in favor of
the trial judge through sentencing.242 Canada and some Australian states and territories are
allowing juries to decide the issue of provocation, but then giving judges substantial ability to
tailor the sentence for manslaughter to fit the circumstances.243 Finally, in the United States,

240

Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 176 (1982).
241
See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
242
See generally VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6.
243
See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, §23(2) (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1900, §13(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.);
54

juries are allowed to decide whether provocation existed.244 However, because of the greater
variety of determinate sentencing for both manslaughter and murder, in some states there may be
substantial room for judges to distinguish among people who plead to or are convicted of
manslaughter based on domestic homicide.245 In others states, regardless of whether the
defendant is a battered woman or a jealous man, a manslaughter sentence is legislatively
determined to be lengthy but less severe than a murder sentence.246
Since social values that are more sympathetic to battered women than jealous men appear
to have taken root in all three countries, it is highly probable that the main reason for Australia’s
greater emphasis on substantive equality in its provocation law, including the willingness to
abolish provocation in some Australian states, is a convergence of strong feminist advocacy and,
in Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, the lack of
mandatory minimum sentencing rules for either manslaughter or murder.
Australian jurisdictions have provided a fascinating new chapter in the history of
provocation. Currently in Australia four quite different provocation regimes exist: (1)
Tasmania’s abolition without making any other changes; (2) Victoria’s abolition while replacing
manslaughter with defensive homicide; (3) New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory’s
retention of a relatively enlightened version of the traditional provocation defense without a
mandatory minimum sentence for murder; and (4) the rest of Australian jurisdictions’ retention

Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, 1913, §281 (W. Austl.); Criminal Code, 1899, § 304
(Queensl.).
244
See generally LEE, supra note 18.
245
See supra note 100.
246
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (first degree murder minimum is twenty-five years);
§193 (a) (noting that “voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for three, six, or eleven years); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(b)(3) (first-degree murder
sentence minimum is fifty years with eligibility for parole after twenty years served); § 200.080
(voluntary manslaughter minimum is one year).
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of traditional provocation rules and mandatory minimum sentences for murder. Assessing over
time how each of these different treatments affects pleas and verdicts involving domestic
homicides will provide evidence of whether one regime clearly assures substantive equality
better than others.
Changing social values have allowed substantive gender equality to finally make its way
into the law of provocation. In all three countries, the willingness to make concessions for male
anger as a human frailty in domestic homicide cases appears to be far less prevalent than in the
past, while empathy for battered women who kill has led to substantive changes in provocation
law and in its application. Until changes in law and social norms relating to determinate
sentencing and self-defense occur, this may be as good as it gets.
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